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LEARNING FROM THE PAST: USING 
KOREMATSU AND OTHER JAPANESE 
INTERNMENT CASES TO PROVIDE 
PROTECTIONS AGAINST IMMIGRATION 
DETENTIONS 
Caleb Ward* 
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning 
to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore, Send 
these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the 
golden door!” 1 
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the darkest periods in modern United States history 
is reoccurring with mixed public approval.  During World War II, 
the United States government enacted executive orders creating a 
curfew, proscribing living areas, and forcing the exclusion and 
detention of all Japanese descendants from the West Coast.2  The 
United States justified these grievous freedom and equality 
violations through an increased need for national security 
“because we [were] at war with [Japan].”3  However, this 
perceived increased need for national security came from a 
fraudulent assessment showing any Japanese-American could be 
*Caleb Ward is a third-year law student at the University of Arkansas School of Law. He
graduated from the University of Arkansas with a bachelor’s degree in Anthropology in 2016
and in 2018 with a Master’s in the same subject. Interested in fighting social inequalities,
Caleb came to law school and plans to pursue a career in criminal law and/or civil rights law.
In trying to help while in law school, Caleb wrote the following article under the advisement
of Prof. Beth Zilberman to try to help stop and prevent immigration detention.
1. The Statue of Liberty.  Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETRY FOUND. (2002),
[https://perma.cc/44AB-8WLT] (reciting a poem inscribed on a plaque at the Statue of 
Liberty).  
2. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 85 (1943); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1944).  Notably, 
in this paper, exclusion means restricting access to enter, be within, or leave an area 
proscribed by the Secretary of War.  Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942). 
3. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
842 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:4 
planning espionage or sabotage of the United States.4  After the 
war, the case constitutionalizing these detentions, Korematsu v. 
United States, became a black mark in United States’ 
jurisprudential history, yet it has still not been completely 
overturned.5  Despite this black mark, the United States is again 
subjecting people to unwarranted detention based on alienage, 
race, and national origin.6  By using only alienage, race, and 
national origin to detain individuals and families in camps and 
correctional facilities,7 the modern immigration detention scheme 
mirrors that of Japanese internment.  Despite Korematsu’s black 
mark, the United States is, again, detaining persons with no real 
detention time limit, but without a world war to provide a fragile 
excuse for the detentions.8  Yet, the United States purportedly 
stands for liberty, justice, and equality.9  However, immigration 
detention, much like the Japanese internment, inhibits liberty, 
justice, and equality for the immigrant populations and, in turn, 
the United States’ ability to represent such ideals.10 
4. See id. at 216-17; Eric L. Muller, Opinion, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court Was Right
to Overturn Korematsu. Now it Needs to Overrule Hirabayashi, L.A. TIMES , (July 3, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/9UMB-ZMJN] (noting that the representation of the danger posed by the 
Japanese-Americans was later shown to be greatly exaggerated at the time). 
5. See Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J. F. 629, 630 (2019);
Carl Takei, The Supreme Court’s Disingenuous Funeral Ceremony for Korematsu, ACLU 
(July 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LFX4-6CKF].  But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 
2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, [and] has been 
overruled in the court of history, . . . .”). 
6. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 229 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting explicit “alien
Japanese” from Federal Order for exclusion); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88 (discussing need 
to separate Germans and Italians based on alienage and Japanese based on national origin); 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 838, 847-48 (2018) (allowing permanent detention of 
immigrants without bond hearing under current immigration law).  
7. See Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence
of Plenary Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.  118, 119, 123-24 (2018); César Cuauhtémoc 
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV.  1346, 1390-
91 (2014). 
8. See Release on bond or conditional parole—Criteria for detention or release—
Release from Custody under IIRAIRA, 1 IMMIGR. LAW & DEFENSE § 7:12 (2020) ; Jennings, 
138 S. Ct. at 847-48 (declining to create a time-limit before giving bond hearing or 
rehearing); see also Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human 
Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
243, 256-58 (2013) (discussing the average length of detention pre-Jennings). 
9. American Government: Democratic Values – Liberty, Equality, Justice,
USHISTORY.ORG, [https://perma.cc/EY2G-99TX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
10. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (holding person could not be detained
after pledging loyalty to United States or when granted leave). 
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 As noted in Trump v. Hawaii, Korematsu is not morally 
good law.11  However, it is likely still valid precedent and unlikely 
to be completely overturned.12  Its law and precedential value, 
then, should be used to protect others from going through the 
same degradation and violated rights the Japanese dealt with 
seventy years ago.13  Primarily, Korematsu and other Japanese 
internment cases created a standard for national origin and 
alienage-based detention not met by current immigration 
detention law.14  Their standard requires an extreme-level State 
interest in national security akin to an imminent espionage threat 
by indiscernible enemy combatants during a world war.15  This 
standard should protect noncitizens from detention by instituting 
a high standard to detain classes based on alienage, race, or 
national origin.  Under this high standard, modern immigration 
detention becomes constitutionally impermissible.  
Part II of this Article will focus on the history and precedent 
created by Japanese internment in the United States as well as 
modern immigration law allowing virtually indefinite immigrant 
detention including those seeking asylum and humanitarian 
protection.16  Part III then analyzes the two sets of law to show 
how the Fourth Amendment issues under Korematsu, Ex parte 
Endo, and Hirabayashi, could be argued as establishing a 
protective, unmet standard for allowing the apprehension and 
detention of noncitizens.17  This standard, then, reveals modern 
immigration law to be unconstitutional while establishing a 
standard to prevent future alienage-based detention. 
11. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
12. See Quinta Jurecic, The Travel Ban Decision and Ghost of Korematsu, LAWFARE
(June 28, 2018), [https://perma.cc/BLA7-LRK6]. 
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-220, 223 (1944); Kaelyne
Yumul Wietelman, Disarming Jackson’s (Re)Loaded Weapon: How Trump v. Hawaii 
Reincarnated Korematsu and How They Can Be Overruled, 23 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 
43, 53-56 (2019). 
14. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20, 223 (describing the high standard); see
also Wietelman, supra note 13  (explaining how modern war on terror concerns do not 
articulate a credible national security interest); Gilman, supra note 8, at 279-80 (highlighting 
the fact that immigration detention in the United States does not meet international norms). 
15. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20, 223.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND
Two sets of law in United States jurisprudence have allowed 
the detention of groups of people based on alienage, race, and 
national origin: law from Japanese internment and law for modern 
immigration detention.18  Though having similar justifications 
and results, the Supreme Court has only recognized Japanese 
internment law as counter to United States’ values.19  
Nonetheless, the cases retain their precedential value.20  The 
second category, laws allowing near indefinite detention for 
immigrants entering the country without a visa, remains good and 
valid law despite its similarities to the previous category.21  
However, the law set by the Japanese internment cases, should, 
through its precedential value and societal backlash, prohibit the 
same internment from occurring again.22  While the laws 
themselves are abhorrent to American and humanitarian ideology, 
they remain precedential law and should be used to correct the 
same wrongs they once enabled.  Essentially, arguments should 
be made that the Japanese internment cases ensure detention 
based on xenophobia cannot happen in the United States again.  
A. Japanese Internment Precedent
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States 
instigated two measures designed to protect the country from 
imminent espionage and sabotage: Executive Orders 9066 and 
18. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (1944) (acknowledging detention on basis of race,
though stating not using animus); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 228 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(quoting explicit “alien Japanese” from Federal Order for exclusion); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943) (discussing need to separate Germans and Italians based on 
alienage and Japanese based on national origin); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847-
48 (2018) (holding §§ 1225 and 1226 applies to the  detention of virtually all illegal 
immigrants). 
19. See e.g. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
20. See Muller, supra note 4 (concerning Hirabayashi); Jurecic, supra note 12.
21. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 (holding § 1225 applies to virtually all immigrants);
Release on bond or conditional parole—Criteria for detention or release—Release from 
Custody under IIRAIRA, 1 IMMIGR. LAW & DEFENSE § 7:12 (2020) (explaining procedure 
to allow indefinite detention).  
22. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83, 104; Jurecic, supra
note 12. 
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9102.23  Executive Order 9066 granted power to the Secretary of 
War and their delegees to proscribe areas as military zones within 
which certain groups were not allowed.24  Executive Order 9066 
also granted the Secretary the authority to provide transportation, 
food, and shelter to those ejected from these military exclusion 
zones.25  Just a month after Executive Order 9066, President 
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9102 into action.26  Executive 
Order 9102 established the War Relocation Authority and granted 
it the power to enforce the exclusions from select areas which 
were determined under Executive Order 9066.27  To secure the 
removed person’s “relocation, maintenance and supervision,” the 
order conferred various powers to authorities including the ability 
to evacuate and supervise areas, purchase land, secure loans, as 
well as make all regulations and delegations needed to enforce 
Executive Order 9066.28 
Hirabayashi v. United States was the first case to 
substantively address these executive orders’ constitutionality.29  
Just before Hirabayashi, Congress passed legislation making it a 
misdemeanor to knowingly violate any order given under the 
powers of Executive Orders 9066 or 9102.30  General DeWitt, 
under Executive Orders 9066 and 9102, then ordered an exclusion 
zone of the “entire Pacific Coast” due to its particular 
vulnerability to espionage and sabotage.31  The exclusion required 
all non-citizen Germans, Italians, Japanese, and all other persons 
of Japanese ancestry to remain in their homes between 8:00 p.m. 
and 6:00 a.m.32  The exclusion also required all the affected 
persons to report to a Civil Control Center by May 11 or 12 to 
register for evacuation.33  By ruling these acts constitutional, the 
Supreme Court allowed exclusion, curfew, and removal based on 
23. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85, 87.
24. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
25. Id.
26. Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (Mar. 18, 1942).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Takei, supra note 5.
30. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1943).
31. Id. at 86.
32. Id. at 88.
33. Id. at 89.
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alienage and national origin to prevent imminent sabotage and 
espionage from an indiscernible enemy combatant.34  The Court 
allowed these actions as “an emergency war measure” because 
there was, allegedly, not enough time to decipher which Japanese-
Americans were enemy combatants and which were normal 
citizens before the war effort was impacted.35  Further, the Court’s 
ruling should be argued as creating a standard with an extreme-
level national security interest in order to detain based on alienage 
or national origin.36 
In Hirabayashi, Gordon Hirabayashi was arrested for 
knowingly violating the imposed curfew and for failing to report 
to a Civilian Control Station.37  To show the executive orders’ 
unconstitutionality, Hirabayashi argued he was not an enemy 
combatant and therefore should not be subject to exclusion; he 
proved this by showing his United States citizenship without an 
allegiance to the Japanese Empire and his parents’ immigration 
from Japan twenty-five years prior.38  Hirabayashi also claimed 
he broke the curfew and failed to report to the Control Center to 
avoid waiving his rights as a United States citizen.39  However, 
the Supreme Court ruled that because Congress had ratified order 
9066 through their own punitive legislation and all actions were 
done to protect the United States from espionage and sabotage 
from an enemy during war, the laws and regulations were 
constitutional as “an emergency war measure.”40  Notably, 
Hirabayashi, unlike the subsequent cases, remains virtually 
uncontroverted precedent.41  In ruling for the government, 
Hirabayashi creates a valid precedent allowing discrimination, 
arrest, and eventually, detention based on alienage, race, and 
nationality, but only as an emergency war measure to prevent 
imminent espionage or sabotage.42 
34. Id. at 88, 100-01.
35. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92, 99; Muller, supra note 4.
36. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95 (discussing the unique circumstances and threat
of imminent espionage allowing proscription). 
37. Id. at 83-84.
38. Id. at 84.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 92.
41. Muller, supra note 4.
42. See id.
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Shortly after Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court included the 
ability to detain under Executive Orders 9066 and 9102, but 
importantly, did not alter the extreme security interest 
necessary.43  In Korematsu, the order at issue fully excluded all 
persons of Japanese origin, requiring them to leave the entire 
Pacific Coast exclusion zone.44  Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu 
refused to be removed from the West Coast merely for being a 
Japanese-American.45  The Court upheld the ability to exclude 
and detain based on national origin and alienage, but noted it 
required the “gravest imminent danger to the public safety[.]”46  
Further, the Court allowed a broad racial application due to the 
threat’s apparent gravity.47  Military authorities had falsely48 
shown it impossible to distinguish between the disloyal and the 
loyal Japanese-Americans in the timely manner required to 
protect national security.49  The Court held “[t]he power to 
exclude include[d] the power to do [so] by force . . . .”50  Thus, 
the detention in “relocation centers,” or military detention centers, 
was constitutional despite a detainee’s total compliance with the 
exclusion orders.51  However, as the Court indicated, doing so still 
required an imminent and extreme threat to national security from 
an indiscernible enemy combatant.52  When combined, 
Korematsu and Hirabayashi, establish precedent allowing 
discrimination, arrest, and detention based on alienage, race, and 
nationality, but only as an emergency war measure to prevent 
imminent espionage or sabotage.53 
43. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
44. See id. at 218 (discussing how the full exclusion is a graver constitutional threat
than the curfew). 
45. Id. at 215-16.
46. Id. at 218.  See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 228  (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting
explicit “alien Japanese” language from the Federal Order for exclusion). 
47. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
48. Muller, supra note 4.  Though the Court cited “intelligence” and reports as
establishing the threat, in reality any such report was based not on actual intel but on an 
official’s personal, racist ideas.  
49. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
50. Id. at 223.
51. Id. at 221-22.
52. Id. at 223.
53. See Muller, supra note 4.
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The last fundamental case constructing the Japanese 
internment law is Ex parte Mitsuye Endo.  Mitsuye Endo, unlike 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, had followed all evacuation orders 
but was still detained in Tule Lake War Relocation Center.54  
Prior to the case, the War Relocation Authority had determined it 
could grant leave from Relocation Centers to persons, pending a 
leave delegation decision.55  To determine leave clearance, the 
delegation would investigate the effect of a petitioner’s release on 
the war effort, public peace, and security of issuing indefinite 
leave.56  However, leave clearance alone would not allow leaving 
a Relocation Center.57  Instead, petitioners also had to apply for 
leave and meet at least one of fourteen conditions.58  Even with 
the conditions met, petitioners could still have been denied leave 
if the delegation determines the leave community is improper for 
petitioners.59  Endo applied and received leave clearance but 
never applied for indefinite leave.60  Notably, Endo’s loyalty to 
the United States went unchallenged, just as Endo did not 
challenge the validity of her detention under armed guard for her 
Japanese ancestry.61  The Government’s main argument for 
requiring continued detention, after showing loyalty, hinged on 
the belief “that the interior states would not accept an 
uncontrolled Japanese migration.”62  The Court held, since Endo 
had uncontested loyalty, it was unlawful for the War Relocation 
Authority to keep detaining her.63  Because Endo no longer 
presented an espionage or sabotage threat, she could not be 
lawfully detained by the War Relocation Authority.64  Thus, even 
in the Japanese internment cases, once the extreme threat to 
national security dissipated, a person could not be detained for 
their alienage, race, or national origin.65 
54. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 284-85 (1944).
55. Id. at 290.
56. Id. at 292.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Endo, 323 U.S. at 293.
60. Id. at 293-94.
61. Id. at 294-95.
62. Id. at 295-96 (quoting General DeWitt’s report to chief of staff).
63. Id. at 297.
64. Endo, 323 U.S. at 302-04.
65. Id.
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Taken together, these three cases and the two executive 
orders, create a standard for detaining persons based on their 
alienage, race, or national origin.66  Because the Fourth 
Amendment and Endo both apply to a person, as opposed to a 
citizen, the rights surrounding detention also apply to 
noncitizens.67  According to the executive orders, Hirabayashi, 
and Korematsu, persons can be detained only to prevent an 
extreme threat to national security which must equal imminent 
espionage by an indiscernible enemy combatant, during wartime, 
when the danger to national security prevents any narrower acts.68  
However, as indicated in Endo, the person can no longer be 
detained once they no longer present a threat to the national 
security interest.69  
Recently, Trump v. Hawaii, a case assessing the 
constitutionality of President Trump’s “Travel Ban,” stated 
Korematsu was “overruled in the court of history” and 
unconstitutional.70  However, this overruling was most likely 
dicta as, just lines before, the court acknowledged Korematsu had 
nothing to do with the case.71  Though contentious, Korematsu 
likely still retains precedential value.72  Even if Korematsu was 
overruled though, Hirabayashi sets the same, high standard of an 
extreme-national security threat while the nation is at war for 
excluding based on alienage, race, and national origin.73  Further, 
Hirabayashi has not had subsequent cases question its validity.74  
Following Korematsu and Hirabayashi, the government can 
create laws to detain individuals based on alienage, race, and 
national origin only to protect extreme national security 
66. See supra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
67. Endo, 323 U.S. at 287-88.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
68. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99, 102-04 (1943). 
69. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 302.
70. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417, 2423 (2018).
71. Greene, supra note 5, at 629.
72. Id.
73. See Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L.
REV. 735, 735-36, 754 (2020). 
74. Amanda L. Tyler, Courts and the Executive in Wartime: A Comparative Study of
the American and British Approaches to the Internment of Citizens During World War II and 
Their Lessons for Today, 107 CAL. L. REV. 789, 848 (2019).  
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interests.75  Thus, the ability to detain a person based on alienage, 
race, or national origin occurs narrowly and only in light of an 
extreme national security interest where it is necessary to stop an 
enemy combatant from espionage during wartime.76  Further, any 
proof the detained does not present such a threat to the interest 
requires release, or at least the potential for release.77 
B. Immigration Detention Law
While immigration law has fluctuated throughout American 
history, since the late 1990s the government has increased the 
restrictions and penalties for those who enter the country prior to 
seeking visas or green cards.78  To understand the current legal 
state, a synopsis of modern law followed by its history and 
evolution is given below.  
1. Current Law and Plenary Power
Beginning in the 1980s with the war on drugs, and increasing 
especially with the events on September 11, 2001, immigration 
and detention policies intensified.79  These increases culminated 
in the modern system where individuals without immigration 
authorization, including those who arrive at the border seeking 
protection, can be detained until a final removal hearing 
determination.80  In other cases with civil detention, the 
government generally must show the person to be a danger to the 
community, a flight risk, or an enemy noncitizen.81  To appeal an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent’s decision to 
75. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88, 103-04 (1943) (allowing the legislation and subsequent 
detentions based on race, alienage, and national origin due to the extreme threat of espionage 
and sabotage during war time).  
76. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218, 223; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88, 92, 95.
77. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302, 304 (1944).
78. See Sharon A. Healey, The Trend Toward the Criminalization and Detention of
Asylum Seekers,  
25 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 181, 182 (2004). 
79. García Hernández, supra note 7, at 1350, 1414.
80. See Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
2141, 2147-48 (2017). 
81. See id. at 2146.
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detain, the burden on appeal rests with the noncitizen to show they 
are not a flight risk or a danger to the community.82  Complicating 
this further is the detention scheme set in 8 U.S.C. section 1226 
which mandates detention for any noncitizen that has committed 
any offense with a possible penalty of one-year or more in 
prison.83 
Additionally, the plenary power doctrine underlies and 
complicates much of immigration law and the law’s ability to 
change over time.  The Supreme Court, in 1889, first declared that 
the government’s legislative and executive branches had 
generally unreviewable control of the nation’s immigration 
policies and laws.84  The plenary power doctrine originally 
granted both branches and their administrative agencies the power 
to make laws and policies that were virtually unreviewable by the 
judiciary.85  In practice, this doctrine gave incredibly high 
deference to the executive and legislative branch’s immigration 
laws, especially when national security was at issue.86  The 
doctrine peaked in the 1950s when Knauff v. Shaughnessy held 
that any procedure authorized by Congress met constitutional due 
process, including indefinite detention of some noncitizens post-
removal proceedings.87   
2. Doctrinal History and Evolution to Current State
 Since the 1950s, the Court began to review, and even 
overrule, some of the laws made by Congress and the executive.88  
The plenary power doctrine’s application, though, continues to be 
fairly nebulous.89  The Court has shown itself willing to both 
82. See id. at 2146.
83. Id. at 2146-47; 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
84. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889); Jennifer
Gordon, Immigration As Commerce: A New Look At The Federal Immigration Power and 
Constitution, 93 IND. LAW J.  653, 661 (2018); Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in The 
Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 79 (2017).  
85. Gordon, supra note 84, at 654.
86. See id. at 654-55.
87. Id. at 664-665; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950). 
88. Kim, supra note 84, at 79.
89. See id. at 89-91 (discussing the decline of plenary power’s use without a solid,
predictable explanation). 
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review immigration laws and policies without mentioning plenary 
power, and uphold laws and executive orders under the doctrine.90  
For example, in 2003, Zadvydas v. Davis overturned 
Shaughessy’s ruling to disallow indefinite detainment for 
noncitizens with a final removal order.91  Recently, the Supreme 
Court held noncitizens have a right to habeas corpus review for 
unlawful detention, but not to gain asylum, and only if the 
noncitizen was statutorily granted such due process right by 
Congress.92  One main theme for when the Court grants deference 
to the government is when national sovereignty or national 
security requires a unified approach.93  The core logic of plenary 
power, since its inception, was to allow the nation to “speak with 
one voice” on topics of national security and foreign affairs.94  
Despite the willingness to review, though, Congress and 
delegated agencies or positions, like the Attorney General, retain 
power and discretion to act within immigration law when national 
security and foreign affairs are at issue.95  
Beginning in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reformation and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)96 created a 
system for “expedited removal” in order to “put certain criminal 
aliens on a fast track for deportation.”97  IIRIRA required all 
immigrants who presented themselves at the border without 
documentation to be detained and assessed for expedited 
removal.98  This requirement includes asylum seekers even 
90. See id. at 87-88; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Thomas, C.,
concurring) (citing Shaugnessey, 338 U.S. 537) (“the President has inherent authority to 
exclude aliens from the country.”).  
91. Kim, supra note 84, at 87-88. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 689
(2001) (distinguishing Shaughnessey, 338 U.S. 537 and discussing Congressional intent and 
meaning to create a presumptive time limit).   
92. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, No. 19-161, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. June 25, 2020) (slip
opinion). 
93. See David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 38-41 (2015). 
94. Id. at 40-41.
95. See id.; Kim, supra note 84, at 96.
96. Healey, supra note 78, at 182; Illegal Immigration Reformation and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 , Pub. L. 104-208 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
97. Deborah Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Mandatory Predeportation Detention Provision of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)) As Amended, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 325, 325 (2003).  
98. See § 302 IIRIRA; Healey, supra note 78, at 182.
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though these refugees are fleeing from countries refusing to give 
them the proper documentation.99  Once detained, the asylum 
seekers can try to prove their need for an asylum hearing by 
proving a credible fear of returning to their country.100  Even if 
the asylum seeker has a credible fear, they remain in detention 
unless they are eligible for parole.101  Yet, the decision for parole 
is made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
detaining entity, without many guiding regulations.102 
 Even if eligible for parole, DHS can set bond with 
supervision orders or release the noncitizen on the their own 
recognizance - which frequently requires some indication of 
financial stability, like being able to live with a family member or 
support themselves.103  Officially, the practice is to release 
noncitizens after an immigration court denies removal  orders 104  
However, cases have shown that the immigrants and asylum 
seekers with favorable hearings have been detained throughout 
DHS’s appeals.105  Though civil immigration detention cannot be 
used as punishment, this practice is designed to deter immigrants 
and asylum seekers from coming to the United States.106  
More broadly, IIRIRA altered the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to include sections demarcating noncitizens with 
certain criminal convictions for mandatory detention.107  8 U.S.C. 
sections 1225-27, codified the procedures for detention of 
noncitizens in removal.108  The statutes also allow continued 
detention during the entirety of the removal process without bond 
or parole determination for mandatory detention.109  This allows 
99. See Healey, supra note 78, at 182.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 182-83.
102. Id. at 183.
103. Id. at 188.
104. See Healey, supra note 78, at 183.
105. See id.
106. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. 237, 237-39 (2019).
107. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, The Perverse Logic of Immigration
Detention: 
Unraveling the Rationality of Imprisoning Immigrants Based on Markers of Race and 
Class Otherness, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 359, 360-61 (2012); Buckman, supra note 97, at 
325.  
108. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-27.
109. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).
854 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:4 
immigration judges to deny bond in non-mandatory cases.110  In 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court assessed the 
mandatory components of these statutes and determined the 
propriety of detention without bond or parole.111  First, the Court 
examined section 1225 and its ability to detain without bond or 
parole.112  It recognized section 1225(b)(1) as authorizing 
detention of immigrants entering by “fraud, misrepresentation, or 
lack of valid documentation.”113  The Court also recognized 
1225(b)(2) “as a catchall provision that applies to all 
applicants. . . .”114  Section 1225(b)(1) created the ability to 
remove noncitizens without a hearing; however it carves out an 
exception for asylum seekers, though requiring that they remain 
in detention.115  Section 1225(b)(2), however, acts as a catchall 
requiring other noncitizens to be detained pending a complete 
removal hearing when an officer cannot immediately determine 
are “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted into the 
country.”116 
The Court then went on to interpret sections 1226 and 1227.  
These sections deal with removal procedure for immigrants 
already in the country.117  Section 1226(c) iterates the categories 
described in 1227 as well as provides the Attorney General power 
to issue warrants and arrest noncitizens with certain criminal 
convictions for a removal proceeding and detention.118  The 
statutes also do not require the Attorney General to set bond or 
parole.119  Like section 1225, section 1226 permits immigrant 
detention until their removal proceeding is fully completed.120  
The Jennings v. Rodriguez decision affirmed this indefinite 
detention of noncitizens awaiting a removal hearing without a 
continuing chance for a bond hearing, by relying on the plenary 
110. Id.
111. Id. at 836.
112. See id. at 836-37.
113. Id. at 837.
114. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b)-(c); Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837.
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).
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power doctrine.121  However, section 1226(c), as used in 
Jennings, applies to noncitizens with criminal convictions or 
alleged criminal conduct already in the country, whereas section 
1225 applies only to those seeking admittance.122  Because 
Jennings concerned a lawful permanent resident going through 
the removal proceedings for committing a crime, pursuant to 
section1226(c), the Court elided the interpretation and detention 
abilities for sections 1225 and 1226.123  Jennings also held that 
since parole and bond hearings were only narrowly applicable, 
sections 1225 and 1226 do not require a bond hearing nor a 
explicit time limit on mandatory detention.124  
In Jennings, the Petitioners argued that the lack of a statutory 
time limit and precedential weight requires an individualized 
hearing to show the need to detain the immigrant, before 
prolonged detention.125  The Court, however, distinguished 
detention under sections 1225 and 1226 from the existing 
immigration precedent, namely Zadvydas v. Davis, requiring a 
bond hearings after six months of detention.126  The Court 
distinguished Jennings since it concerned ongoing proceedings 
under sections 1225 and 1226 instead of hearings requiring 
removal under section 1231—which concerned the detention and 
removal of immigrants who were ordered removed from the 
United States.127  The Court found sections 1225 and 1226 do not 
allow indefinite detention since the statutes have a terminal event: 
final adjudication.128  Again, though, detention can last months or 
years depending on the appellate process and immigration court 
backlog.129  Under both statutes and Jennings, immigration 
authorities are free to detain immigrants and asylum seekers 
indefinitely based solely on their alienage.130  
121. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 844 (using the Congress’s differing statutory language
to overturn the Court of Appeals application of Zadvydas v. Davis in this case). 
122. Id. at 845.
123. See id. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying three separate categories here
and in analysis). 
124. Id. at 842 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 839.
126. Jennings, 138 S. Ct at 843.
127. Id.; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-27.
128. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 845-6.
129. See Healey, supra note 78, at 182-83.
130. See supra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.
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The recent decision in Matter of M-S-, a case from the Board 
of Immigration Appeals, cites Jennings and various statutes to 
force detention on asylum seekers after establishing credible 
fear.131  In the case, the respondent, an asylum seeker who was 
originally placed on expedited removal, was placed in a full 
removal proceeding after showing credible fear for asylum and 
granted bond through an immigration court.132  Attorney General 
Barr, however, found the immigrant was not eligible for bond 
before completing his full removal and asylum proceeding.133  
This case, then, overturned Board precedent allowing asylum 
seekers who established credible fear to have a custody 
redetermination hearing before an immigration judge.134  It also 
ignores an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
requiring warrants to continue detaining immigrants transferred 
from expedited to full proceedings.135  Instead, the opinion 
excludes bond and bond hearings for immigrants after 
transferring to the lengthier process unless they fit within the 
narrow, explicit exceptions for temporary parole: urgent 
humanitarian crises or significant public benefits.136  The opinion 
only validates its interpretation by determining that the parole 
statute was exhaustive while the statute with categories requiring 
detention was non-exhaustive.137  Thus, asylum seekers could be 
included implicitly in the required detention category and only 
paroled for two exceptions.138  Although the Board treats all 
detentions equal, the Board chose to detain more immigrants for 
longer periods with no real justification other than its having the 
ability.139 
Notably, noncitizens are deemed “detained” in the facilities, 
sometimes jails and prisons, instead of incarcerated, since 
131. Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509-10 (Att’y Gen. 2019). As of publication
date, this is still valid law though distinguished in the 9th Circuit. 
132. Id.at 510.
133. Id.
134. Id (calling prior case, Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (BIA 2005) “wrongly
decided”). 
135. See id. at 515-16.
136. M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 516.
137. Id. at 515-16.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 509-10, 515-19.
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immigration law is civil meaning it cannot use punitive 
measures.140  The Supreme Court has even held that the label of 
civil immigration law does not allow Congress to make 
fundamentally punitive acts applicable to noncitizens.141  Yet, the 
Court ruled deportation is akin to criminal punishment.142  
However, it refused to expand the law to include civil 
detention.143  Additionally, Matter of M-S- expands the category 
of those immigrants who are ineligible for bond to include those 
apprehended within the United States borders.144 
The modern state of immigration detention, then, permits 
detaining noncitizens and asylum seekers without proper 
documentation at the border and either putting them on an 
expedited removal track or continuing detention until removal 
and asylum hearings and their appeals end.145  Once detained, 
immigrants and asylum seekers remain detained as deterrence for 
other immigrants.146  This detention lasts throughout their 
proceedings without any time limit, opportunity for a bond 
hearing, or a realistic opportunity for parole.147  The detention 
ends only after a final adjudication of their removal 
proceedings.148  Further, the statutes’ interpretation separated this 
detainment from prior immigration cases, which required bond 
hearings, allowing cases brought under section 1225 - 1227 to 
result in near indefinite detention.149  As immigration laws, they 
are all also statutes granting permission to detain solely on the 
basis of alienage.150  Because the mere label of civil deterrence 
cannot prevent constitutional protections, the same standard set 
140. See García Hernández, supra note 7, at 1413 (discussing facilities used to detain).
141. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
142. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (“Our law has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century . . . .”). 
143. See id (affirming proceedings were still civil).
144. M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. at 515-16.
145. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).
146. Ryo, supra note 106 at 237-39.
147. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 (describing statutory procedures); Healey, supra
note 78, at 188 (discussing difficulty posting bond even after qualifying). 
148. Buckman, supra note 97, at § 5 (citing Kwon v. Comfort, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1144-45 (D. Colo. 2001)). 
149. See Gilman, supra note 8, at 256-58 (explaining the procedure can last years and
lasts longer when fought). 
150. HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
A LEGAL OVERVIEW 2 (2019). 
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by the Japanese internment laws to allow detention for alienage, 
race, or national origin should govern the immigrants’ detention 
for their alienage.151 
III. APPLICATION
Immigration detention generally falls under civil law since 
“[u]nlawful presence in the United States does not itself constitute 
a federal crime. . . .”152  Under civil law, the United States can 
only detain individuals when a legitimate, special interest 
outweighs the person’s constitutional interest in remaining 
free.153  However, the detention cannot constitute punishment.154  
In the past, the United States has traditionally recognized three 
situations that provide the ability to detain people through civil 
law.155  These situations occur when the detainee is a danger to 
the community, a flight risk, or an extreme national security 
risk.156  Notably, the second category can be considered largely 
inapplicable.  Little to no evidence exists showing asylum seekers 
to be a flight risk; instead, when noncitizens were released on 
community-based detention alternatives, there was a ninety-six 
percent appearance rate.157  For example, those released on their 
own recognizance maintained a seventy-eight percent compliance 
rate.158  Thus, the ability to detain immigrants and asylum seekers 
until their removal proceedings are finalized likely only occurs 
pursuant to the first and third categories.159  Similarly, national 
security was the justification for Japanese internment during 
151. Matt Ford, The Return of Korematsu, THE ATLANTIC, (Nov. 19, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/THL4-A349]. 
152. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing case law and
statutes concerning Immigration and Nationality Act). 
153. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
154. See id. (elaborating on when civil detention can occur).
155. See id. at 688-92 (discussing national security as well as two statutory reasons to
civilly detain). 
156. See id; R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (citing cases requiring consideration of
national security and deterrence value in asylum seeker release hearings). 
157. Marouf, supra note 80, at 2165.
158. See generally id. at 2155-70 (discussing alternatives and successes); see also
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (emphasizing low flight risks). 
159. See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 17 (2019). 
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World War II.160  In fact, to allow the Japanese interment, the 
Court elided the first and third categories so the perceived 
community danger both increased the national security risk and 
was amplified by the ongoing war.161  Statutes and case law, like 
Jennings, have tried to separate immigration from the typical civil 
detention scheme.162  However, the ability to detain, even by 
statute, must comport with the Supreme Court’s standard for 
detaining based on alienage, race, or national origin: the standard 
set out by the Japanese internment cases.163  
The first category, presenting a danger to the community, 
allows “preventive detention based on dangerousness only when 
limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong 
procedural protections.”164  Moreover, for a potentially indefinite 
detention, like in immigration, the danger must be coupled with 
“some other special circumstance.”165  To detain under the third 
category, national security risk, the government must show a 
direct and actual national security risk.166  Together, these 
categories created the justification for detention in the Japanese 
internment cases, which means their precedent creates the 
minimum standard for long-term civil detention under these 
interests.167  Current immigration detention reasons, in turn, fall 
far short from meeting the Japanese internment cases’ standard.168  
Simply, immigration detention fails to justify itself through an 
actual and acute threat or concerning especially dangerous 
individuals.169  For instance, to allow the ability to detain all 
immigrants, judges had to interpret the immigration detention 
160. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944).
161. See id. at 217-18.
162. See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842-46 (2018).
163. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
92 (1943). 
164. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001).
165. Id. at 691.
166. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 190 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Incantation of the
magic words ‘national security’ without further substantiation is simply not enough to justify 
significant deprivations of liberty.”). 
167. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92.
168. Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18, and Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92, with
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842-846. 
169. Gilman, supra note 8, at 318, 321; See also Megan Shields Casturo, Civil
Immigration Detention: When Civil Detention Turns Carceral, 122 PENN STATE L. REV. 
825, 830, 840 (2018). 
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statutes as applying to criminal-immigrants, undocumented 
immigrants, and those seeking asylum equally despite different 
statutory sections for each.170  Further, the national security issues 
center on resource allocation issues within ICE, and only a 
minority of immigrants present a community threat, despite even 
the slightest criminal charge being used to deny bond.171  Thus, 
neither of the two state interests rise to the level of indiscernible 
enemy plotting imminent sabotage during war, which should be 
required to allow long-term detentions as it was with Japanese 
internment.  
The Japanese internment cases allowed civil detention based 
on alienage, race, and national origin only for the heightened and 
specific national security and community danger interests.172  The 
ability to detain came from statutes and executive orders granting 
the Secretary of War and their designees the ability to detain 
classes based on alienage, race, and national origin.173  These 
statutes, as seen in the cases, were only constitutional due to the 
heightened national security at the time—acting as an 
“emergency war measure.”174  Notably, the Court did not 
elaborate or require a general timeframe for release.  The Court 
was satisfied that at some point a resolution would occur releasing 
all detainees.175  Thus, though there was no timeframe in months 
or years for the detention’s end, making it for an indeterminate 
period, it was still constitutional.176  The statutes were 
constitutional, though, only because of both the ongoing war with 
Japan and the plead threat about imminent espionage or sabotage 
from indiscernible enemy combatants within the country, which 
seemingly heightened the government’s national security 
interests.177  Together, the war and espionage threat heightened 
170. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837-38 (finding the statute applies equally).
171. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-88; Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 228-29 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting explicit “alien Japanese” from Federal 
Order for exclusion); Marouf, supra note 80, at 2147-48 (discussing shoplifting and minimal 
marijuana charges as reasons for detention). 
172. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S at 92 (calling it an “emergency war measure”).
173. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-18.
174. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92.
175. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222 (acknowledging detention was for an
indeterminate period). 
176. Id. at 221-23.
177. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-88.
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national security by appearing to create a time pressure to prevent 
imminent espionage and sabotage from indiscernible 
combatants.178  Because the cases allowed civil detention based 
on alienage and national origin, their precedent creates the 
standard for all similar detentions. 
The law and reasoning behind immigration detention mirrors 
the Japanese internment cases.179  However, it lacks the 
heightened interests required for continuous detention.  Like the 
Japanese internment cases, the ability to detain immigrants and 
asylum seekers came from statutes, regulations, Executive 
Orders, and agencies guidance.180  Underpinning these statutes, 
though ignored in Jennings, should be an extreme need to protect 
communities or national security.181  However, the argument for 
both arises largely from economic concerns in dealing with mass 
migration not an actual threat to safety.182  However the biggest 
national security risk, presented in R.I.L.-R, is a fear of resource 
allocation due to an influx of immigrants, not a direct and actual 
attack or threat to citizens’ safety.183  Similarly, though political 
speeches claim an increased immigrant crime rate which 
endangers communities, research from Texas showed 
immigrants, especially undocumented and asylees, have a lower 
crime rate than United States born persons.184  Thus, even if both 
claimed interests were valid and combined, the threat to national 
178. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95 (emphasizing the urgency of the situation
precipitated by the attack on Pearl Harbor).; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18. 
179. See Rosenbaum, supra note 7.
180. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (acknowledging the plenary
power doctrine requires judicial deference). 
181. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688; see generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830
(2018). 
182. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C 2015).
183. Id.
184. See Horsley, FACT CHECK: Trump, Illegal Immigration, and Crime, NPR (June
22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/PP2Q-4H94] (discussing rhetoric like: “‘They don’t talk about 
the death and destruction caused by people who shouldn’t be here,’ the president said.  
‘People that will continuously get into trouble and do bad things’”); Alex Nowrasteh, 
Criminal Immigrants in Texas: Illegal Immigrant Conviction and Arrest Rates for homicide, 
Sex Crimes, Larceny, and Other Crimes, CATO INST.: IMMIGR. RES. AND POL’Y BRIEF NO. 
4, [https://perma.cc/ZGF4-92S6]. 
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security and communities fall far short of the Japanese internment 
standard.185  
Similarly, the immigration statues, like those for Japanese 
internment, have been held to only allow definite detention since 
the detention is terminated upon final decision in a removal 
proceeding.186  The final decision, and in turn detention, could 
potentially last months or years.  Yet, the notion of an eventual 
final decision by a court, satisfied the Supreme Court that 
immigrant detainees were not detained indefinitely.187  Because 
the national security and community danger concerns generally 
deal with relatively minor economic issues, they do not usurp the 
immigrants’ constitutional interest in remaining free.188  
The differences between state interests in each detention 
reveal the Japanese internment’s standard for event-terminated 
detention based on alienage, race, and national origin set is unmet 
by current immigration law.  For Japanese internment, the Court, 
though based on misrepresented intelligence data,189 saw a dire 
situation where Japanese or Japanese-American hidden 
combatants planned to sabotage the United States during the 
ongoing war.190  This inability to timely distinguish the loyal, 
non-combatant Japanese-Americans, from the potential, hidden 
agents to prevent espionage, combined with the already 
heightened security interests from the ongoing war, allowed their 
detentions.191  Further, the language in Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu, stating the detention’s validity as an “emergency war 
measure” indicate these threats are the minimum standard for 
185. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1994); see also R.I.L-R, 80
F. Supp. 3d at 189.
186. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845 (2018).  But see Jennings, 138 S.
Ct. at 874 (Breyer concurrence) (pointing out the detentions are, effectually, indefinite). 
187. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (fining sections are not “‘silent’ as to the length of
detention [since i]t mandates detention ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be 
removed from the United States’”). 
188. See R.I.L.-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (finding plead governmental interests in
national security through resource use inadequate). 
189. Muller, supra note 4.
190. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
99 (1943)). 
191. Id. at 218-19.
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detention.192  Allowing detention as an emergency war measure 
indicates that, without a similar level of a national security 
interest, the detention could not be constitutional.193  Thus, it 
should be argued the government, though based on 
misinformation, created a standard allowing civil detention due to 
a specific and extremely high national security concern.  This 
standard requires a threat equal to the safety and integrity of the 
United States during an ongoing World War from indiscernible 
enemy combatants.194 
As for the concerns allowing detention, modern political 
rhetoric attempts to increase community apprehension regarding 
the danger that immigration poses, but lacks evidence to verify 
the claims.195  For instance, then-Presidential candidate Trump 
famously said Mexico was sending “people that have lots of 
problems, . . . [] [t]hey’re bringing drugs[, t]hey’re bringing 
crime[, and t]hey’re rapists.”196  Since then, Trump and his 
supporters have continued an inaccurate crime-focused narrative 
of noncitizens to justify increasing immigration regulation.197  At 
a rally in Wisconsin, then-Presidential candidate Trump stated 
that unauthorized migration massively strains “communities and 
schools and hospitals and public resources, like nobody’s ever 
seen before.”198  This rhetoric attempts to increase community 
apprehension regarding the danger immigration poses to 
communities by hyperbolizing any potential danger to 
infrastructure and crime rates. 
However, the studies comparing native born and immigrant 
crime rates negate this perception.199  For instance, illegal 
immigrants are 16% less likely to commit homicide, about 7.9% 
less likely to commit sexual crimes, and 77% less likely to 
192. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
219-20.
193. See id. at 99-100.
194. See id. at 99.
195. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015, 2:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/SK4H-
DHUW]. 
196. Id.
197. See Horsley, supra note 183.
198. Calvin Woodard & Hope Yen, AP FACT CHECK: Trump’s misleading rhetoric
on immigrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 29, 2019), [https://perma.cc/S3ZJ-WDSG]. 
199. Hee Lee, supra note 194; Horsley, supra note 183; Nowrasteh, supra note 183.
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commit larceny than the native-born populations.200  In drug 
crimes during 2013, four out of five smuggling arrests involved 
United States citizens.201  Overall, male immigrants ages 18 to 59 
have an internal incarceration rate of 1.6%, while native-born 
males have an incarceration rate of 3.3%.202  Despite the political 
rhetoric, immigrants pose virtually no significant danger to their 
communities.  
Additional political rhetoric implies that undocumented 
immigrants and asylum seekers must be detained in order to 
thwart terrorist attacks under the guise of immigration and 
asylum.203  Even more than the increased crime rates, though, 
there is no evidence to support this.  In fact, between 1975 and 
2017, the chance of being killed by an asylee or undocumented 
noncitizen was 1 in 1.3 billion.204  Further, when caught or 
applying for asylum, the noncitizens must still pass through the 
terrorist vetting procedures before they are permitted to stay.205  
Thus, immigrants and asylum seekers pose virtually no threat to 
the United States populace through increased crime or terroristic 
threats.206  
Next, the arguments around national security in immigration 
fall drastically short of this standard.  The national security 
concerns in immigration arise largely from an economic strain on 
ICE personnel and resources.207  However, the supposed 
economic strain on ICE does not indicate an immigration influx 
would weaken ICE, “overwhelm[] the country’s borders or 
wreak[] havoc in southwestern cities.”208  This threat to ICE’s 
resource allocation209 cannot be equivalent to espionage and 
sabotage by an indiscernible enemy combatant during wartime.  
Though increased immigration would likely increase the local 
200. Nowrasteh, supra note 183.
201. Hee Lee, supra note 194 (citing a Center for Investigative Reporting study).
202. Id. (citing American Immigration Council report on 2010 Census data).
203. See Alex Nowrasteh, Does The Migrant Caravan Pose A Serious Terrorism




207. R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C. 2015).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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infrastructural costs, a purely economic threat to increased 
resource use does not necessarily rise to the level of a national 
security threat.210  Current immigration national security interests 
only concern a minor, if existent, economic strain on a single 
administrative agency failing to meet the minimum standard to 
detain all immigrants.211  Even the minimal threat immigrants do 
pose falls far short of the extreme national security threat standard 
created by the Japanese internment cases.212  A slight increased 
strain on infrastructural budgets, watered-down crime rates, and 
the small chance of terrorism cannot equal the threat to national 
security that imminent espionage by indiscernible enemy 
combatants pose.  Therefore, neither of the required underlying 
interests for constitutional civil detention are met concerning 
immigrant detention.213 
Together, the Japanese internment cases create a high 
standard for detaining classes based on alienage, race, and 
national origin.  To civilly detain based on alienage or national 
origin, the government must show an extreme interest in national 
security, akin to an imminent threat by an indiscernible enemy 
combatant during an ongoing war.214  Then, if the detention is 
pending an event without a known timeframe, the government 
must also show that if released, the detainee would pose a threat 
to the public.215  Importantly, even if this standard is met, the 
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Illegal Immigration
Crisis and Border Security, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 1. 2018, 4:19 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/2NBM-7JB3] (pleading mostly economic harm from increased “illegal 
immigration”); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1944) 
(explaining that the compulsory exclusion of citizens from their homes would be inconsistent 
with basic governmental institutions, unless doing so would prevent espionage and sabotage 
in dire circumstances). 
213. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18 (upholding the legality of the exclusion order
of all persons of Japanese ancestry from threatened areas at certain times, so as to protect 
against espionage and sabotage).  
214. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) (requiring special
dangerousness and strong procedural protections to civilly detain based on future danger); 
see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 
(1943)) (using potential espionage by an indiscernible enemy combatant as standard for 
dangerous group). 
215. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91.
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government must release the detainee if the detainee proves not 
to be a threat to national security or the community.216  
Current immigration detention, then, fails this standard and, 
therefore, should not be permitted.  The alleged threat to national 
security comes not from a fear of imminent espionage or sabotage 
but from unsubstantiated claims of increased crime and 
speculated infrastructural strain on ICE.217  Further, even this 
threat could be ameliorated through alternative, cost-effective, 
and more humane measures to ensure asylum seekers, refugees, 
and other immigrants appear in court.218  For instance, parole 
programs or ankle monitors, though also problematic, drastically 
reduce costs while ensuring court appearances.219  The saved 
money could be channeled back to ease the infrastructural 
burden.220 
Further, to review detention, courts can overcome the 
plenary power doctrine by reviewing the standard set by the 
Japanese internment cases, an extreme national security interest, 
is met before granting any judicial deference to the statutes and 
administrative policies.221  Because the plenary power doctrine 
must still comport with constitutional rights and interests and 
immigration detention is civil detention based on alienage and 
national origin, courts should ensure that the constitutional 
standard requiring an extreme security interest is met before 
granting the law’s plenary power deference.222  
The next argument for using Korematsu to prevent 
prolonged or nearly indefinite immigrant detentions pulls not 
from existing law, but from constitutional and cultural values.  At 
the beginning, this Article quoted the inscription and description 
216. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
217. See Remarks by President Trump on the Illegal Immigration Crisis and Border
Security, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 1. 2018, 4:19 PM), [https://perma.cc/74EW-24FT]. 
218. Healey, supra note 78, at 188-89 (noting a high success rate and halved cost for a
parole or telephone surveillance system to ensure appearances in court). 
219. Marouf, supra note 80, at 2161-62.
220. Id. at 2160, 2162, 2165; see ROBERT RECTOR & JASON RICHWINE, THE
HERITAGE FOUND.,  FISCAL COST OF UNLAWFUL IMMIGRANTS AND AMNESTY TO THE U.S. 
TAXPAYER 15 (May 6th, 2013); see David Becerra et al., Fear vs. Facts: Examining the 
Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigrants in the U.S., 39 W. MICH. U. J. SOC. & SOC. 
WELFARE 111, 128 (2012).  
221. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-20; Gordon, supra note 84. at 661.
222. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-20; Gordon, supra note 84, at 661.
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for the Statue of Liberty.223  Though definitionally changing 
through time, the United States always meant to stand for justice, 
liberty, and equality for all persons.224  To stand for these values, 
these cruxes of the American way, they must be deeper than facial 
policy concerns or self-aggrandizing sentiment.  Instead of 
learning from our mistakes in Japanese internment, the country is 
again detaining groups of people based on alienage and national 
origin.225  This time on a people seeking hope, a new life, or 
refuge.  The United States cannot say it stands for freedom, 
liberty, and justice while detaining those who seek protection and 
hope.  
The United States was supposed to be a beacon of hope, the 
City on the Hill, to inspire the world to follow it in providing 
freedom and equality for all peoples.226  Yet, laws allowing, 
proscribing, and requiring prolonged detention for immigrants, 
from those seeking asylum to those wanting a better life, violate 
these core tenets.227  In this xenophobic mindset, the United States 
deprives itself of what was supposed to make it great.  Worse, this 
exact situation has happened in the past: interning hundreds of 
thousands of Japanese and Japanese Americans based on a 
misrepresented notion they posed some threat to the United States 
during World War II.  Since then, the United States claims to 
regret not standing for liberty and freedom for a group within its 
borders.228  
And now, again, the United States is detaining a more 
vulnerable population who just seek protection and/or a better life 
for themselves and their family.229  Instead of having open arms 
223. Lazarus, supra note 1.
224. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. pmbl.
225. See Jack Rockers & Elizabeth Troutman, Dangerous Detention: Human Rights
Standards and Enforcement in Immigration Detention, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF L. 
IMMIGR. & HUM. RTS. POL’Y CLINIC 1, 6, 9 (2009). 
226. John F. Kennedy, City Upon a Hill Speech JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL
LIBRARY AND MUSEUM (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U9KY-PFKR] 
(Transcript of President-elect John F. Kennedy, addressing a Joint Convention of the General 
Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on Jan. 9, 1961), 
227. Rockers & Troutman, supra note 225, at 22, 23.
228. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (stating Korematsu was wrong
the day it was decided and has been overruled through cultural history). 
229. . E.C. Gogolak, Ankle Monitors Weigh in on Immigrant Mothers Released from
Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), [https://perma.cc/75E3-YFW7]. 
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and doors for the tired and poor, these policies specifically aim to 
slam that door in their face and construct a wall in front of it.  If 
the United States wants to truly stand for equality, liberty, and 
justice for All Persons, it cannot continue to detain immigrants 
seeking a better life nearly indefinitely. To learn from our past, 
we must argue the Japanese internment cases create a standard so 
high it prevents indefinite or event-based detention of any person 
based on their alienage, race, or national origin.  Recently, the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal and a Second Circuit 
District Court found that an immigrant cannot be detained 
indefinitely without serious constitutional concerns.230  This 
finding came after finding a reasonable belief the petitioner could 
not be removed despite their final removal order and a conviction 
for engaging in terroristic activities.231  So why, then, should the 
United States continue to allow the detention of people whose 
only crime or fault is entering the country seeking a better life?  
Moving the United States toward the values it is supposed to 
protect in this situation merely requires learning from a past 
mistake.  Despite Korematsu’s ill-repute, the other cases, setting 
the same standard, are still valid law.232  Thus, this law should be 
used to ensure that similar liberty violations will cease and not 
reoccur.  Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Ex parte Endo, can and 
should be used to require an extreme level national security 
interest for prolonged civil detention based on race and national 
origin.233  Then this standard, when applied to detained 
immigrants, reveals the necessary interests are not met and 
requires the release of immigrants.  
Notably, the direct legal or policy driven argument against 
detaining noncitizens is not the same as stating noncitizens can 
never be detained or monitored.  While the initial, and ideally 
brief, processing period could allow detention for administrative 
230. Hassoun v. Searls, 427 F. Supp. 3d, 357, 366, 372 (W.D.N.Y 2019).
 (W.D.N.Y., 2019).  Specifically, these Circuits found the regulation 8 C.F.R 241.14, 
“authorized” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, to detain specific immigrants indefinitely was 
unconstitutional. 
231. See id. at 362.
232. See Karen Korematsu, How the Supreme Court Replaced One Injustice with
Another, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), [https://perma.cc/RA8F-B2NX]. 
233. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 287 (1944). 
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relief, there is no reason the detention must continue throughout 
their hearing process.234  Instead, another form of monitoring 
could be used to ensure the immigrants appear throughout their 
proceedings without posing a threat to citizens.  For instance, the 
use of ankle monitors and required telephone check-ins or just 
community programs allow for immigrants to continue life and 
maintain their liberty.235  Further, that type of surveillance has a 
93% success rate and less than half the cost of detention.236  
However, for the asylum seeking population, and likely the 
majority of the detained noncitizen population, these measures 
are superfluous and only prolong the trauma they are fleeing, 
albeit less than detention.237  For a population fleeing their homes 
for fear of violence, persecution, and torture, the need to appear 
in court for their hearings or notion of deportation is enough to 
ensure appearance.238  The best solution, then, is to have a system 
where immigrants are detained for the minimum amount of time 
necessary to screen for health issues and begin asylum or visa 
cases.  Once the appropriate proceeding has been filed and health 
screened, the immigrant should be released on bond, with a 
monitor, or , ideally, with only the looming threat of voiding their 
proceeding and deportation to ensure compliance.  Ideally, the 
system would release the immigrants with the minimum amount 
of liberty impedance necessary.  After all, the people currently 
detained or monitored are victims of violence or threats of 
violence to themselves and their families who do not need a 
reminder or elongation of their trauma or they are people who just 
want to a better life for themselves and their family.239 
234. See Seeking Release from Immigration Detention, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 3 (Sept.
13, 2019),[https://perma.cc/K4K6-9LUB]. 
235. See Marouf, supra note 80, at 2164-70 (discussing community based alternatives
after electronic monitoring). Notably, while a more comprehensive discussion of more than 
adequate alternatives is out of the scope of this paper, the Fatma Marouf article just cited 
contains a fairly comprehensive discussion of the topic.  
236. Healey, supra note 78, at 188.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States immigration detention system prevents 
the United States from truly standing for liberty, equality, and 
justice by detaining immigrants seeking a better, safer life.  The 
United States has held people in detention, or internment camps, 
based on their alienage and national origin through executive 
orders solidified by case law pleading national security.  
However, these orders and court decisions are deemed a disgrace 
in the United States’ history.240  Now, the United States is again 
holding people based on their alienage and national origin 
through executive orders solidified by recent case law pleading 
national security.  To learn from its past mistakes, though, the 
Japanese internment cases should be read to create a standard for 
all civil detentions based on alienage and national origin.  This 
standard requires an extreme level of national security interest 
akin to an imminent threat by unknown and indistinguishable 
enemy combatants during wartime.  This standard, when applied 
to immigrant and asylum detentions, whose main national 
security threat concerns resource allocation to a government 
agency, fails to meet this standard. 
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